Wisconsin's Act 10 in 2011 effectively eliminated collective bargaining rights for public school teachers and mandated benefits cuts for most districts. We use differencein-differences methods on Midwestern school district data from 2002-13 to examine the act's net impact on compensation and employment, finding that Act 10 coincided with significant benefit declines that went beyond the statutory language. We find no such Wisconsin-specific impacts for salary, which declined throughout the region after 2011. Controlling for funding level and composition reveals that only Wisconsin school districts have seen the number of teachers per student rise in the years since Act 10.
consin specific nature of Act 10 drives us to identify the answers to our primary questions using between-state variation. In addition to simple difference-in-differences analysis and regressions with year fixed effects, we also explore piecewise linear specifications that expand the potential for interpretation and hypothesis-testing and that provide support for the assumption of pre-treatment parallel trends.
Besides confirming the sizable reduction to Wisconsin benefits mandated by Act 10, we identify a number of novel results. Both Wisconsin and other Midwestern states witnessed comparable declines in average salary since 2011, but unlike the other Midwestern states, benefits in Wisconsin have continued to fall since Act 10's passage. After 2011, the teacher health insurance market is significantly less concentrated, average deductibles are higher, and teachers contribute a larger share of the premium. Of most note for application outside of this instance, Wisconsin has seen significant growth in its teacher-per-student ratio since 2011 after controlling for funding levels and composition, a finding not present in the other Midwestern states. This last result is proof of concept that, beyond any budgetary savings, PEU reform can yield beneficial in-class consequences.
Background
Wisconsin has long been at the vanguard of PEU policy, as it was the first state to permit unionized teachers in 1959. Collective bargaining created natural tension with taxpayers, and the state has periodically experimented with tactics to balance the interests of the affected parties. From 1993 to 2008, unions and districts were bound by Qualified Economic Offer (QEO) legislation.
Under this law, a district and union that could not agree on a contract would see an automatic 3.8% increase in total compensation rather than go to arbitration. Districts varied in how often the QEO was invoked. This provision and Wisconsin's ban on teachers' strikes ensured that some districts' unions could theoretically be constrained by statutory rather than purely economic considerations.
Coverage of the QEO in the popular or industry press is minimal at best, and it is unclear how often, if ever, the QEO was applied.
The national Democratic political wave of 2008 gave Wisconsin Democrats unified control of the state government (governor and both legislative houses) for the first time in decades. While Democrats broadly increased their state-level representation throughout the Midwest, no other state saw a move to unified government that year. 3 Wisconsin repealed the QEO on June 29, 2009, as part of Act 28, meaning lack of an agreement would send the contract to an arbitrator who would make a non-binding recommendation. 4 There is some support in the popular press that this repeal had minimal impact, suggesting that the QEO may have had relatively little bite in practice. 5 The 2010 elections saw state-level political reversals throughout the Midwest. Wisconsin flipped from unified Democratic control to unified Republican control, and Republicans also took unified control in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. 6 Nationally, the elections saw the Republicans take control of the House of Representatives and reduce the size of the Democrats' Senate majority. The change of House control directly affected the allocation of federal funding to school districts. It is also likely that the general electoral mood carried over to local elections and referenda.
Wisconsin Republicans took advantage of this opportunity and on February 11, 2011, proposed Act 10 (Wisconsin Repair Budget Bill). Act 10 applies to most non-emergency public sector employees; however, we will only discuss its provisions as they apply to teachers and teachers' unions. We enumerate those provisions below.
1) Teachers' unions may collectively bargain only on cost of living adjustments to base (i.e., minimum) salary unless passed by district referendum. 7 These adjustments are capped by the measured inflation rate. This provision removed from negotiation health and pension benefits, health insurance provider, number of teachers to be hired, and other margins that had previously been subject to collective bargaining. Districts are free to increase teacher pay through raises for additional education, experience, or merit.
2) Employers and employees must each pay half of the total retirement benefits as determined by the Employer Trust Fund board. Prior to Act 10, the state-wide Board set the percentage of salary to be paid as well as the employee-employer division. Districts, however, could pay some or all of the teachers' share as a result of collective bargaining.
3) Districts that provide health insurance plans that are qualified as "Tier 1" ("Cadillac" plans) must pay between 50% and 88% of the premium. Lower tier (quality) plans are not subject to the 88% cap. 8 Prior to Act 10, it was common for collective bargaining to yield outcomes in which districts paid 100% of the premium for all plans. 4) Contracts may last only one year, rather than potentially spanning multiple years as before. 5) Districts may no longer require teachers to join the local union, and districts may not collect union dues from teacher paychecks.
In all, these provisions marked both an immediate reduction in teacher compensation and the prospect of lower future levels and growth in teacher compensation.
Parallel to these provisions, Wisconsin was dealing with a projected $3.6B shortfall (roughly 5% of that year's state revenues) in its two-year budget, a fact that was often raised by proponents to justify Act 10's austere provisions. 9 While then-candidate Walker's only PEU reform campaign plank had been a call to reinstate the QEO, he had generally run on tax-cutting rhetoric. 10 Besides cutting state funding for public schools, the government lowered the cap on how much funding a district could raise through state aid and property taxes, forcing many districts to lower their property tax rates even with the reduction of state aid. 11 In all, Wisconsin districts faced sizable funding decreases, with legislators arguing that the additional flexibility from Act 10 would allow for such cost savings that there would be no decline in educational quality. Act 10's proposal sparked statewide protests that captured national attention. The state house was immobilized by protesters, and many schools were forced to close because of teacher sickouts. 12 The Senate's Democratic minority temporarily deprived that legislative body of a quorum by crossing into Illinois to flee the state troopers sent to arrest them and return them to Madison.
The Republicans' unified control of government, however, ensured that the protests were ultimately futile, and Governor Walker signed Act 10 into law on March 11, 2011. Walker went on to survive a recall effort on June 5, 2012, and was re-elected in November 2014. Litigation uncertainty was resolved in July 2014 when the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled Act 10 to be constitutional.
Of critical importance for our identification strategy, Act 10 was the only legislative change during this time that might have affected teacher compensation and hiring. While Governor Walker signed legislation on social issues (e.g., defunding Planned Parenthood, restricting abortion) and voter identification and rejected the Medicaid expansion accompanying the Affordable Care Act, his only other act on K-12 education was the Read to Lead Development Fund (signed in April 2012). The purpose of this bill was to fund the evaluation of kindergartners' reading skills, though it also created a system that would permit the evaluation of teachers using standardized tests. The grant's initial funding of $400,000 with additional annual appropriations of $23,600 and minimal interest earnings indicate that this program is far too small to have had any impact on compensation and employment. 13 To our knowledge, there are at present only two papers that specifically consider the effects of Act 10 on teachers and school districts. Biasi (2017) uses within-Wisconsin variation in how districts chose to negotiate salaries following Act 10 to examine how teachers respond to merit pay incentives, effectively focusing on within-district dispersion and cross-district "churn". She finds that teachers respond to merit pay by self-sorting into districts based on their value-added and that this increases the overall quality of the labor force. Biasi offers no insight into changes in benefits, which was one of the areas most impacted by Act 10. Following these reduced-form estimates, Biasi estimates supply and demand under an assumed competitive teacher labor market.
Her budget constraint for districts, however, fails to account for the funding cuts which accompanied Act 10, an oversight that undermines the validity of her structural results. Litten (2016) uses variation in the expiration of pre-Act 10 contracts to examine the effects of teacher compensation and employment. He finds that, following Act 10's provisions becoming effective, a district's average per-teacher compensation falls by $6,500, largely driven by a decline in benefits, and class size changes insignificantly. The former result is analogous to our finding, though our identification strategy permits the finding of significant results on class size and benefits from larger sample sizes. Due to a questionable identifying assumption regarding contract expiration and the relatively small sample size, the conclusions in this paper are tenuous. 14 While the other Midwestern states faced similar political trends and structural issues regarding education, none have enacted such substantive and lasting PEU reform on compensation. On 
Data
We construct a dataset that can illuminate all aspects of the above story: funding, compensation, and employment. The common political trends of the relevant years, however, raise the risk of mis-attributing to Act 10 consequences that were common to many states. To address this concern, we employ as our control group a set of comparable Midwestern states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio. 16 We also limit our study to the school-years 2002-03 to 2013-14. Data after the 2013-2014 school year were not readily available at the time of this writing. 17 All original sources are available in the data appendix.
The Census Bureau publishes school finance data. 18 From this we obtain measures of total district revenue as well as revenue divided by source into state, federal, all local (including property taxes) and property tax revenue. We then construct the final category of local funding, defined as the difference between total local revenue and property taxes. Local funding includes any sources of funding that are not from state or federal government or from property taxes and includes school registration fees and district-dedicated income tax revenue. We divide all five of these funding categories by the number of students (discussed below) to obtain per student measures of funding. The Census data also include annual district-level expenditures for instruction on salaries and benefits.
We sum these to generate total expenditures on compensation and use these to construct average per-teacher expenditures and per-student expenditures. We drop any district-years for which average salary is below $15,000, as we expect that such observations reflect misreported data. 19 Given this construction, compensation changes might be actual (e.g., a teacher's salary is cut) or compo-sitional (e.g., costly older teachers retire and are replaced with younger, cheaper teachers).
Our second dependent variable comes from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Local Education Agency (LEA) Universe Survey. Conducted annually, the NCES LEA data contain general district, student, and staff information for every public and private agency that provides educational services in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. By matching unique district identification codes with the Census data, we extract the Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin public school districts from the larger data set. 20 This survey data includes a measure of full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) decomposed by grade level/type. Full-time equivalents are calculated to the nearest hundredth based on the fraction of hours worked relative to a full-time position. If a district reports zero or negative FTE teachers in a given year, we remove that observation from our data set. 21 From the LEA we also pull the number of students in a district.
We discard any district-year that does not report a strictly positive number of students and use this to construct a measure of full-time equivalent teachers per 1,000 students (FTE/Students). 22 This measure of teacher quantity is an intuitive way to pool districts of various student populations, and of course smaller class sizes have the potential to influence student outcomes. Previous studies have linked smaller classes to higher test scores for elementary students, increased propensity to take college admissions tests, and lower dropout rates. 23 Our other independent variables come from the 2000 Census, the American Community Sur- Census as well where possible. 24 The SAIPE includes a yearly measure of school district population that we use in combination with the number of students to calculate the share of the district enrolled in public school (% Student). Lastly, because districts encompassing Native American reservations have a different funding structure and receive considerably more federal funding than other districts, we combine the ACS and SAIPE to calculate the percentage of the district that is Native American. 25 We exclude any district that reports a Native American population comprising 20% or more of the district population to avoid biasing our results. 26 After creating these variables and cleaning the data, our final data set has 39,890 observations from 3,436 districts across the 7 states and 12 years. There are 4,284 district years from Iowa, 9,392 from Illinois, 3,477 from Indiana, 6,469 from Michigan, 3,931 from Minnesota, 7,332 from Ohio, and 5,005 from Wisconsin. 27 Summary statistics for 2002-10 and 2011-13 for both Wisconsin and the other Midwestern states can be found in Table 1 . These time periods coincide with the pre-and post-Act 10 periods.
All monetary amounts are in real 2000 dollars as deflated by the Midwest CPI by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In comparison to other Midwestern states, Wisconsin districts through 2010 paid somewhat less in salary and considerably more in benefits. This benefit gap is completely eliminated after 2011. Wisconsin districts also have notably more teachers per student than districts in the Midwest control states. On funding, Wisconsin districts spent more per student than the other states, levels that were supported primarily by higher property taxes.
While our estimates focus on average teacher salary and benefits, it is also instructive to consider a district's salary and benefit expenditure per student in the face of differing class sizes. By this measure, Wisconsin teachers have slightly higher salaries before 2011, and the benefit discrepancy before Act 10 is magnified to almost 50%. After Act 10, Wisconsin's relative benefit margin is reduced to 9%. We observe incomes that are about 13% lower in 2011-2013 relative to 2002-2010. While our later regression estimates include income, we confirmed that our results were robust to its exclusion.
Model and Estimation
We are interested in how levels of our dependent variables differ across regimes between Wisconsin and the other Midwestern states and how dependent variables may have changed within regimes differentially between Wisconsin and the controls. The first questions are answered most transparently through simple difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. 28 As is standard in DID estimation, we include binary indicators for the Act 10 era (2011-13) and for Wisconsin as well as an interaction of the two. Our intercept therefore represents the mean dependent variable for nonWisconsin districts prior to 2011, and the other regime indicators' estimates are relative to that.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction is the parameter of most interest and, if the identifying assumptions are valid, captures the causal impact of Act 10.
In DID estimation, the identifying assumption is that outcomes in Wisconsin would closely track trends in the other Midwestern states absent the policy change. This assumption can be supported by demonstrating pre-treatment parallel trends between the treatment and control states.
Ideally, we would include year fixed effects along with a Wisconsin dummy interacted with year fixed effects and show a lack of pre-treatment significance on the interaction terms. While maximally flexible, these year fixed effects in our application suffer from poor precision and complicate hypothesis-testing. We therefore complement estimation that incorporates these year fixed effects with the estimation of the following piecewise linear specification:
The function is continuous within the pre-and post-Act 10 eras, but we allow for a discontinuity and new slope with the implementation of Act 10. 29 Because we include district fixed effects, initial levels in the above equation are not identified. These estimated parameters then facilitate hypothesis testing regarding within-regime trends as well cross-regime changes. We complement this piecewise function with controls for median family income and the percentage of the population enrolled in public school along with district fixed effects. Our model identifies average impacts across districts. To the extent that districts with different characteristics exploit Act 10's provisions to different extents, our results would not be able to identify this. 30 As it appears that teachers' union popularity and power were greatest in the most urban areas, we experimented with interacting a measure of urban-ness with the piecewise function in our model. 31 The results for our variables of interest were largely unchanged.
Recognizing that year fixed effects are the unrestricted ideal, we confirmed that our results are not driven by this more restrictive functional form. Including controls for the exogenous variables income and percentage of the district that are students but excluding funding, we superimpose our piecewise linear implications atop estimated year fixed effects in Figures 2 to 5 . 32 These figures demonstrate that the point estimates for the shared time-dependent parameters of our specification are generally very close to those obtained when using year fixed effects. That is, the trend line produced by the piecewise function lies within the confidence interval around the year fixed effects.
This is true for both the estimates for all states and for the Wisconsin marginal effects. 33 These figures provide a second benefit beyond considering the fit of our piecewise linear specification. The fact that the Wisconsin graphs display the marginal effects in Wisconsin against the control states provides easy verification of pre-treatment parallel trends; most of the pre-treatment
Wisconsin marginal effects are not statistically different from zero. In the cases when parallel trends are violated (i.e., Wisconsin pre-treatment marginal effects are significantly different from zero), the pre-treatment Wisconsin-specific trends are in opposition to the later results. For example, Wisconsin benefits increase more than other states before Act 10, but Wisconsin's Act 10 impact on benefits is negative. If important, this would bias our results towards zero, yielding relatively conservative estimates. At the risk of revealing our eventual conclusions, the key results on compensation and employment are all illustrated here, and it is clear that the story is supported by the estimates that permit year fixed effects. Thus, with little loss in information but much gain in precision and ease of comparison, we concentrate our discussion on the piecewise linear specification.
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Results can be found in Tables 2-9 . For each set of dependent variables, we first consider simple DID results with no controls and then turn to our piecewise linear specification with district fixed effects and controls for income, the percentage of the population that is enrolled in the local school district, and funding. We are sensitive to the critique that the Wisconsin-specific nature of the treatment effects reduces our functional number of observations. This issue raises the concern that serial correlation among state-level unobservables may generate standard errors that are understated. Because we use only seven states of data and so are far from plausibly appealing to asymptotic results, we follow the procedure suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) and use a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure at the state level to construct corrected p-values. Each bootstrap contains 1,000 replications, and state-clustered p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.
Given the nature of the bootstrapping procedure, we elect to report p-values rather than attempting to recover standard errors.
Funding
Our primary policy question is disentangling the cumulative impact of Act 10's provisions from the nearly simultaneous funding changes. Understanding these funding changes is therefore fundamental, and we begin our analysis there. Table 2 contains the simple DID funding results   while Table 3 contains the full model. Results are consistent with the conventional narative that we described above. The DID estimates reveal that our Midwestern control states saw no significant difference in funding between the two periods. Wisconsin, however, averaged $1232 (13%) more in per-student funding than the control states pre-2011. Wisconsin's total funding difference across the two regimes was significantly lower than that of the control states ($515). The lower state funding and property taxes in Wisconsin's Act 10 regime are also large (respectively $470 and $211 per student), though neither is significant at conventional levels.
The piecewise linear specification further illuminates these results in Table 3 students corresponds with needing less funding per student. This presumably arises as districts mitigate (or encounter) discrete-teacher problems that occur with small numbers of students; it is impossible to have fewer than one teacher in a grade.
Per-Teacher Compensation
We report the remaining DID estimates in Table 4 . Looking first at column ( The salary results found in column (2) of Table 4 and all of Table 6 are largely insignificant.
Beginning with the first row, the lack of a significant pre-2011 trend suggests that unions in all states are only able to negotiate total salary increases that keep up with the rate of inflation. This, however, changes following 2011; now all states see a roughly $800 (about 1%) yearly decline in salary. That is, collective bargaining on salary in all states after 2011 is not able to keep up with the rate of inflation. Overall Wisconsin sees no trends distinct from the rest of the Midwest; Act 10 did not apparently affect real average salary. The Wisconsin interactions are all insignificant. In particular, the insignificant estimated coefficient on the WI(2002-'10) trend is consistent with our assumption of parallel trends.
Act 10 concentrated its provisions on benefits, and so it is here that we expect to see the greatest impacts (column (3) of Table 4 and Table 7 ). Both tables indicate that the compensation cuts observed earlier are due primarily to benefits. Prior to 2011, Wisconsin benefits are higher than the control states ($5,200) . In the piecewise specification, the pre-2011 trend is steeper in Wisconsin than the control states, though not at conventional levels. 35 The control states see no discontinuous change in benefits in 2011, and, from 2011 on, benefits in the control states are growing at an insignificant rate. Wisconsin, however, sees a $5,500 cut in benefits in 2011 and a $1,100 decline in every year thereafter. Some of the Wisconsin cut is likely due to the cap on "Cadillac" plans which are now subject to an employer maximum of 88% of the premium; however, the language of the law does not mandate the continual decline that we observe.
We do not have enough data to draw conclusions as to the reason for this benefits cut; however, we can offer a few theories. Miller et al. (2005) notes that the high-cost Wisconsin Educator's Association Insurance Corporation provided many school districts with health insurance. It is possible that, by eliminating the unions' influence on the choice of health insurance provider, districts are able to solicit bids from multiple providers and find a lower cost plan. Alternatively, districts could be using the lack of union push-back to provide teachers with lower quality health insurance or simply to require that teachers pay a higher share of their insurance costs.
While we cannot offer in-depth analysis, we can provide some evidence regarding this benefits reduction. Through the 2012-2013 school year, the Wisconsin Association of School Boards conducted a voluntary survey asking districts to provide information about their health insurance plans including provider, the deductible, and the share of the premium paid by the district. 36 We provide summary statistics from 2006-2012 in Table 8 . As can be seen in the table, the market share for the Wisconsin Educator's Association Insurance Corporation (WEAIC) is dramatically lower after the passage of Act 10. Pre-2011, WEAIC had a nearly 70% market share, more than 10 times the next largest competitor. Following Act 10, WEAIC still has the largest market share, but it is less then half of its previous level. Unsurprisingly given the above result, market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is also considerably lower following Act 10 (1,289 vs. 4,825).
There are two possible stories for this change. First, when health insurance was subject to collective bargaining, local unions insisted on using WEAIC because of its close link to the state union. From its positon of power WEAIC was able to charge supracompetitive prices and either earn economic profit or operate with high costs. Alternatively, it is also possible that WEAIC plans were high cost due to their higher quality. When health insurance is no longer under the purview of collective bargaining, districts choose to substitute to lower cost plans with other providers. This latter story is partially borne out by the increases in single and family deductibles. Both types see dramatic increases (over 500% increases for both singles and families); however, the standard deviation is much larger after 2011. Regardless of the mechanism, health insurance premiums are modestly (roughly 10%) lower in the latter time period. Districts are also paying approximately five percentage points fewer of the premium cost than before Act 10.
While compensation levels, trends, and composition were the direct target of Act 10, policy is also concerned with outcomes that tie more directly to student performance. Given this, we now turn our attention to the most straightforward of our educational inputs, the teacher-per-pupil ratio.
To the extent that our compensation results have real consequences, we expect them to appear here. Table 4 's column 4 reports the DID estimates while Table 9 reports the full model results for full-time equivalent teachers per 100 students (FTE). 37 Echoing the summary statistics, Wisconsin has significantly more teachers per 100 students in the simple DID results. After including district fixed effects and controls, we see in Table 9 that Aside from Act 10, our sample period exhibits exceptional variation in funding over time and so is a rare opportunity to precisely estimate the impact of funding on hiring. The estimates shown in column 2 indicate that an increase in total funding of slightly over $5000 per student would lead to an additional FTE per 100 students. For non-Wisconsin states, this corresponds to a 56% increase in funding leading to a 15% increase in FTEs or a reduced-form elasticity of 0.3. Column 3 shows that the funding source also matters for employment. Property tax funding is the only funding source that exhibits a significant positive effect on FTEs. The intuition of this result is straightforward: To the extent that property tax funding is simultaneously locally controlled and relatively stable over time, it would be the preferred funding source when hiring long-term employees. Furthermore, the negative and significant coefficient on % Students suggests that there are some economies of scale to teaching; as the share of the population enrolled in the local public schools increases, districts are able to increase the number of teachers at a slower rate. and toward state funding that was documented in Table 3 drives the result that Act 10 provisions had an even greater impact on FTEs after 2011's immediate effect. 38 Thus, the results we find are not due to a delayed reaction. Act 10 did permit districts the efficiency gains to hire more teachers when conditioning on the same level of funding.
Full-Time Equivalent Teachers

Discussion & Conclusion
Taken together, our econometric evidence indicates that Act 10 led to declines in benefits for
Wisconsin's teachers that went beyond the immediate declines explicitly codified in the law. Lower health insurance expenditures were supported by a more competitive provider market, increased deductibles, and a partial shifting of premiums toward teachers. The lower benefit expenses effectively decreased the price of teachers to districts to such an extent that they overwhelmed the impacts of reduced funding levels in relatively short order. The questions remaining, however, are whether these results capture the full story of Act 10's consequences and the broader lessons from
Wisconsin's experience.
The most obvious omission of our paper is teacher quality. The literature is now clear that teacher quality is an important determinant of student outcomes, and our data sources are unable to inform on this margin. 39 It is possible that, while Wisconsin's number of teachers did not de-crease, the quality of its teachers did. This is a difficult charge to rebut. The absence of compulsory testing that is comparable across states and the challenges of using voluntary tests such as the ACT make a similar cross-state comparison of test scores infeasible. Biasi (2017) , however, has data and an empirical framework better suited to addressing this issue. Using estimates based on an admittedly crude measure of teacher value-added, that paper concludes that Act 10's provisions, if fully exploited by all districts, would lead to a modest increase in teacher quality as low-quality teachers exit. Until other evidence comes to light, it seems that the teacher-quality criticism does not disqualify our conclusions.
Our results that Wisconsin districts after Act 10 succeeded in simultaneously lowering compensation and increasing the number of teachers are consistent with a substantial reduction of supply-side market power and inconsistent with a pure monopsony story. The magnitude of this impact is complicated by the fact that teachers are unlikely to value $1 of benefits as equivalent to $1 of salary, yet Wisconsin teachers' compensation declines were entirely from benefits. As the tax-avoidance gains from taking compensation as benefits and the value of individualized choice permitted by compensation as salary run counter to each other, we cannot be sure of even the direction of this net impact. Regardless of these details, it appears that there were at least some efficiency gains from Act 10, though those gains were also accompanied by substantial transfers from teachers to taxpayers.
We suggest caution in extrapolating from Wisconsin's linear trends since Act 10. It is here that the restrictiveness of our piecewise specification is likely to be the most problematic, in that the specification will rationalize a one-time change followed by no change (or the converse) as a continuous change. More conceptually, the continual reduction of benefits will eventually lead to teacher exit with further compensation reductions leading to the labor market equilibrium then downwardly tracing teacher supply and reducing FTEs. This concern and quantifying the gains from reduced market power as previously discussed suggest the value of structural estimation of both sides of the market. While the competitive framework of Biasi (2017) and its omission of funding data limit that exercise's usefulness, such an approach is in sprit exactly what is required. 2 Previous work on union strength and outcomes indicates that collective bargaining leads to higher compensation (Chambers, 1977; Gallagher, 1979; Hoxby, 1996) and worse student performance (Moe, 2009; Lott and Kenny, 2013) . The impact of collective bargaining on student-teacher ratios is contested (Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009; Strunk, 2011 Litten (2016) argues that, because districts typically negotiated two-year contracts pre-Act 10, those that were "off-cycle" due to previous contract disputes can serve as a control group. The timing of contract disputes before Act 10, though, was probably not independent across districts, and districts with historically confrontational approaches toward their unions presumably responded differently to Act 10 than more accommodating districts.
expenditures on behalf of the district, which the NCES data do not, and therefore is more in line with our goal.
19 There are seven district-years that are dropped due to this restriction. 20 Given the number of common names for school districts, these ID codes are crucial. While there is only one Kokomo district, there are for example nine districts each named Franklin and
Hamilton. Ohio has eight Buckeye school districts, and Illinois is fond of the names "Community Consolidated" and "Community Unit". 21 There are 1,018 district-years that list zero or negative teachers. Negative values arise due to missing data or quality concerns on the part of the NCES.
22 Thirteen district-years are dropped because of this.
23 See Angrist and Lavy (1999) ; Boozer and Rouse (2001); Hoxby (1996) ; Jepsen and Rivkin (2009); Krueger and Whitmore (2001) . 24 While the specific interpolation thresholds are debatable, we note that our results are robust to the exclusion of these controls. 25 For example, lands held by the federal government in trust on behalf of Native Americans on reservations and buildings on reservations are not taxable. 26 We lose 236 district-years with this restriction. 27 We have no data for the 2012-13 school year for all Illinois school districts due to missing FTE numbers from the LEA.
28 These estimates of course merely facilitate hypothesis testing regarding the previously discussed summary statistics. 29 As anecdotal evidence suggests it had little practical importance, we choose to ignore the QEO in our specification. 30 For example, the Madison school district went to great lengths to lock in a contract before Act 10's provisions took effect (http://isthmus.com/news/news/madison-teachers-inc-goingstrong-despite-act-10/) 25 the 12 ordered categories a numerical value, where 1 is the most rural and 12 is the most urban (e.g. Milwaukee, Cleveland, etc.) . 32 To the extent that Act 10 and the funding cuts were effectively simultaneous, this net impact over 2011-2013 most closely represents the aggregate impact of the policy package. 33 The other regressors' estimated coefficients are generally of the same sign and significance level across the two models.
34 Federal funding comes primarily from ESEA Title I support for disadvantaged students and IDEA Part(B) which supports special needs students (See: https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/ fed/10facts/index.html?exp=5).
35 While this may call our parallel trends assumption into question, the magnitude of the results are small relative to our other results and the coefficient's sign reverses after Act 10. 36 The pre-2011 response rate for this survey was 75% on average, while the post-2011 response rate was 29%. Mean comparisons against a preliminary sample suggest no reason to suspect selection bias.
37 While it greatly complicates pooling districts of different sizes, we ran similar regressions with full-time equivalent teachers on the left hand side and controlling for number of students on the right hand side; normalizing by the number of students is not driving our results. 38 We recognize that the point estimate in our preferred specification is only marginally significant; however, we believe, given its increased magnitude, this is due to multicollinearity rather than a diminution of Wisconsin's trend after 2011.
39 See Chetty et al. (2014); Hanushek (2011) . Unit of observation is a district-year. Reported R 2 is the within-R 2 . Reported R 2 is the within-R 2 . Reported R 2 is the within-R 2 . Reported R 2 is the within-R 2 .
